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DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING, FTC FACT FINDING AND
THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
The extent of the seventh amendment's' guarantee to trial by jury in "suits
at common law" has raised difficulties since the adoption of the Constitution. 2
Courts were quick to recognize that the right extended beyond the common
law as it existed in 1791, 3 and thus focused their attention on developing a
process for examining the jury trial guarantee. 4 The process has not been a
static one, 5 but has developed according to the demands of the law.
At the time of the seventh amendment's adoption the distinction between a
trial by jury and a trial by the court was the distinction between law and
equity. 6 The determination of what was a suit at common law was made
along historical lines. Justice Story summed up this approach in 1830:
By common law [the framers] meant . . . not merely suits, which the common law
recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were
to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights
alone were recognised, and equitable remedies were administered .... In a just sense,
the amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits, which are not of
equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may
assume to settle legal rights.7
Despite the merger of law and equity, the historical distinction has retained
importance for jury trial purposes. An historical analysis appears indispensa-
ble to any jury trial inquiry8 and was emphasized in the post-merger
evaluation process outlined by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Ross
v. Bernhard:
1. U.S. Const. amend. VII provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to tile
rules of the common law."
2. The federal courts in the early 1800s held that the seventh amendment referred to the
common law of England, not colonial or state practices. Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 212, 221-24 (1818); see Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222-23 (1963); James, Right to a
Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 Yale L.J. 655, 655-64 (1963) [hereinafter cited as James];
Comment, The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes: History Adrift in a Maelstrom, 68
Nw. U.L. Rev. 503, 506 (1973) [hereinafter cited as History Adrift].
3. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830). Later decisions include: Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532-33 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1962);
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959). A restrictive Interpretation of
the seventh amendment is set forth in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 543-51 (1970) (Burger,
C.J., Stewart, & Harlan, JJ., dissenting) and Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476-77, 487
(1935).
4. See notes 9-44 infra and accompanying text.
5. See James 664.
6. Fenn v. Holme, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 481, 486-87 (1858).
7. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830) (Louisiana allowed reviewing
courts to reverse jury determinations of fact; such review not available in federal courts); see The
Sarah, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 391, 394 (1823). See also James 657-63; History Adrift 506-08.
8. But see The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 172-76 (1970).
SEVENTH AMENDMENT
[T]he "legal" nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger
custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the
practical abilities and limitations of juries. Of these factors, the first, requiring
extensive and possibly abstruse historical inquiry, is obviously the most difficult to
apply.9
In Ross the Court's awareness of the flexibility necessary for appraisal of the
jury trial question was significant. There a derivative action was brought by
the shareholders of a corporation. The Court acknowledged that the
shareholders' right to sue was equitable,10 but noted the process by which
equitable practices "worked over into law":
[F]rom 1789 until 1938, the judicial code expressly forbade courts of equity from
entertaining any suit for which there was an adequate remedy at law. .. . If, before
1938, the law had borrowed from equity, as it borrowed other things, the idea that
stockholders could litigate for their recalcitrant corporation, the corporate claim, if
legal, would undoubtedly have been tried to a jury."
Since the remedy sought-money damages-was traditionally legal,' 2 a jury
trial was required. The Court, concerned with the obstacles equitable pro-
cedural devices might present to the adjudication of legal substantive rights,
observed that the guarantee of a jury trial "should not turn on how the parties
happen to be brought into court." 13 The decision can be seen as the logical
outcome of the merger of law and equity in the federal courts.
1 4
While the right to jury trial may be affected by the posture of the action, it
9. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.1o (1970); see DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826,
836 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964) (first jury trial granted in derivative suit).
10. 396 U.S. at 538.
11. Id. at 539 (footnote omitted); see James 657-63.
12. See Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1018 (4th Cir. 1965)
(suit against union for damages, jury trial awarded).
13. 396 U.S. at 542 n.15. After the merger of law and equity the test applied by the courts
looked to the basic nature of the issue. If the complaint set forth a single equitable claim, there
was no jury trial. If a legal and equitable claim were joined, the seventh amendment was
applicable. See 5 J. Moore, Federal Practice 38.16, at 153-62.2 (2d ed. 1974). However, the
Court in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) and Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) rejected such a narrow approach since the right to a jury trial
depended to a great extent upon the plaintiffs formulation of his claim for relief. In Beacon, the
Court held that the defendant was entitled to a jury trial on his counterclaim for treble damages.
although the plaintiff's complaint sought only declaratory relief. The underlying premise was that
once the equitable claim was determined, the issues in the legal claim might be res judicata. See
359 U.S. at 510-11; cf. Fleitman v. Welsbach Co., 240 U.S. 27, 29 (1916). In Dairy Queen the
plaintiff sought an injunction against trademark infringement and an accounting for damages.
The Court awarded a jury trial, stating that the guarantee could not be defeated by casting a
legal issue in an equitable form. 369 U.S. at 479. The Ross decision was an extension of this
analysis since it indicated that Dairy Queen was not limited to cases where independent actions at
law could have been brought. See 5 J. Moore, Federal Practice 38.16, at 162.5 (2d ed. 1974).
14. The dissent opposed this analysis: "Somehow the Amendment and the Rules magically
interact to do what each separately was expressly intended not to do, namely, to enlarge the right
to a jury trial in civil actions brought in the courts of the United States." 396 U.S. at 543 (Burger,
C.J., Stewart, & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
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can also be affected by what has occurred prior to the judicial proceeding. In
some fields, Congress has allocated the duty to conduct fact finding to
administrative agencies, in light of their expertise. 15 Thus, in matters con-
cerning, inter alia, trade practices and labor relations the "jury" function is to
some extent in the agency, and the administrative hearing process is to some
extent a surrogate for jury trial. 1 6
Matters within the authority of federal agencies arguably are not "suits at
common law," concerned as they are with problems which are mainly
products of modern society. However, the seventh amendment may attach
and the private party may invoke a jury right. 17 Here, as in other areas, the
federal courts have attempted to employ a flexible analysis, and the scope of
jury trial in administrative review has been narrow, in deference to agency
expertise and in recognition of the "practical abilities and limitations of
juries."' 8
Nevertheless, a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit appears to have fallen away from any flexible inquiry in its
award of a jury trial to an advertiser following over ten years of administra-
tive hearings by, and judicial review of, the Federal Trade Commission.
United States v. J.B. Williams Co. 19 held, inter alia, that when a factual
dispute arises as to whether an advertisement is violative of a presently
existing FTC cease and desist order, a jury must resolve the issue.
The leading decision concerning the jury right in the agency context is
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 20 The Supreme Court there upheld an
award of back pay without a jury trial in an unfair labor practice proceeding.
Although back pay awards have been described as equitable in nature, 21 the
decision was based on effecting the agency function. The Court stated:
The instant case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of such a suit. The
proceeding is one unknown to the common law. It is a statutory proceeding. Rein-
15. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937); History Adrift 518. See generally Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250,
1267-68 (3d Cir. 1974) (agency has "greatest degree of latitude" in conducting proceedings).
16. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974); Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165,
170 (7th Cir. 1942) (FTC as "triers of the facts"); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative
Action 87-99 (1965); History Adrift 531-33.
17. E.g., United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 421-22 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Hindman, 179 F. Supp. 926, 928 (D.N.J. 1960).
18. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
19. 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
20. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 278 F. Supp. 632, 637
(S.D. Tex. 1968), the court stated that Jones & Laughlin was overruled by Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), but the
decision was reversed at 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971). The
erroneous assumption of the district court was that Jones & Laughlin was based on a theory of
incidental jurisdiction.
21. Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 991 (1-971) (back pay award part of main equitable claim); Smith v. Hampton Training
School, 360 F.2d 577, 581 n.8 (4th Cir. 1966) (back pay award integral part of equitable remedy).
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statement of the employee and payment for time lost are requirements imposed for
violation of the statute and are remedies appropriate to its enforcement.2 2
An adjunct of the agency function rationale is the theory of an equitable
public right. 23 The basis of this theory was set forth in Agwilines v. NLRB,
-2 4
again as part of an argument that back pay awards were to be exempted from
the seventh amendment:
Statutory provisions of this kind in the public interest are not considered as conferring
common-law rights requiring trial by jury. They provide for public proceedings,
equitable in their nature. They exert power to restore status disturbed in violation of
statutory injunction similar to that exerted by a chancellor in issuing mandatory orders
to restore status.
25
It has been suggested that "public right language" might thus remove any
statutory scheme from the strictures of the seventh amendment where "litiga-
tion involved issues . . . more concerned with 'public policy' than with
'private right' "26
Courts have also examined the impact the seventh amendment would have
on the efficiency of the statutory proceeding itself. Jones & Laughlin has
recently been re-affirmed on such a basis, the Court pointing out that a jury
trial "would be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative
adjudication and would substantially interfere with the NLRB's role in the
statutory scheme. "27 Similarly, in Katchen v. Landy,28 a Bankruptcy Act
22. 301 U.S. at 48-49; see Agwilines v. NLRB, 87 F.2d 146, 150 (5th Cir. 1936). In Guthrie
Nat'l Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528, 537 (1899), the defendants questioned the authority of a
district court to proceed without a jury in approving determinations by a territorial commission of
claims which arose against certain municipalities before they were incorporated. The Supreme
Court rejected the applicability of the seventh amendment since the "proceeding under [the act
was] not in the nature of a suit at common law." See also History Adrift 527-30.
23. See History Adrift 517-20.
24. 87 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1936).
25. Id. at 151. But see Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 Harv. L.
Rev. 720 (1946). Under the National Labor Relations Act only administrators have standing to
sue. Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214, 215 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972). Similarly, in
Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 988-89 (D.C. Cir. 1973). the court held that
there was no private cause of action to enforce unfair or deceptive trade practices prohibited
under the Federal Trade Commission Act. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.2 (1974). The absence of a private
cause of action is suggested as one basis for applying the equitable public right theory. History
Adrift 518 n.75.
26. History Adrift 518. Compare Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of
Review, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 914, 919 (1966): "In situations when individuals stand to suffer serious
liabilities as a consequence of administrative action, justice may be served by demanding
increased procedural protections."
27. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (footnote omitted). Professor Jaffe, who
favors jury trial in FTC penalty proceedings, see text accompanying note 101 infra, noted with
regard to the NLRB that "the concept of expertise on which the administrative agency rests is not
consistent with the use by it of a jury as fact finder." L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative
Action 90 (1965). But cf. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 684 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
28. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
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proceeding, 29 the Supreme Court was apprehensive over possible interference
by a jury. There the plaintiff filed a claim for the balance of a debt owed him
by the bankrupt. The trustee counterclaimed alleging that the plaintiff had
already received a voidable preference. Though recovery of the preference
would have required a jury trial if the trustee had sued initially, the court's
right to adjudicate the question in a summary proceeding was upheld. To do
otherwise would result in "dismembering" a statutory scheme which Congress
had "prescribed," and would be contrary to Congress' intention that such
claims be "summarily determined. '30 The Court's reliance on the danger of
dismembering the statutory scheme is of interest since the statute did not
characterize 3 1 the right involved as legal or equitable, and did not expressly
mention the desirability of prompt trial of these claims. The decision relied
29. Equity's incidental jurisdiction was formerly a basis for denying a jury trial, especially in
bankruptcy proceedings. The Court in Katchen recognized this: " 'So, in cases of bankruptcy,
many incidental questions arise in the course of administering the bankrupt estate, which would
ordinarily be pure cases at law, and in respect of their facts triable by jury, but, as belonging to
the bankruptcy proceedings, they become cases over which the bankruptcy court, which acts as a
court of equity, exercises exclusive control.' " Id. at 337, quoting Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S.
126, 134 (1881). The Court in Jones & Laughlin stated that the seventh amendment "has no
application to cases where recovery of money damages is an incident to equitable relief." 301 U.S.
at 48. The rejection of "incidental relief" as a basis for denial of a jury trial in Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470 (1962) does not affect these decisions based on broad statutory
schemes. See text accompanying notes 20-26 supra. But see McFerren v. County Bd. of Educ.,
455 F.2d 199, 204 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972).
30. 382 U.S. at 339.
31. One of the main problems in jury trial inquiry is congressional characterization of the
statutory right or absence of it. Conflict arises not only as to whether the action is to be tried by
judge or jury, but also as to whether the proceeding is civil or criminal. In the latter situation, the
courts are to make the determination by disregarding the statutory label and looking to the
substance, application, purpose and remedy of the statute. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
94-96 (1958); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935); Irey v. Occupational Safety
and Health Review Comm'n, No. 73-1765, at 7-8 (3d Cir., Nov. 4, 1974). Generally, however,
where "Congress has characterized the remedy as civil and the only consequence of a judgment
for the Government is a money penalty, the courts have taken Congress at its word." United
States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974); see Hepner v. United States, 213
U.S. 103 (1909) (penalty); Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 54243 (1871)
(reliance on statutory language "be sued for and recovered" as denoting civil action). See also
History Adrift 530-31.
In determining the nature of the civil action, congressional silence has to some extent prompted
the development of the different procedures for examining the jury trial right. However, even
where a legislative characterization is given, it is not controlling since there are limits to
legislative restriction of the seventh amendment. See Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109 (1891)
("[T]he enforcement in the Federal courts of new equitable rights created by the States [may not
impair] any right conferred . . . by the Constitution or laws of the United States."). See also
Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370, 373 (9th Cir. 1961), It has been
suggested that constitutional problems in this area could be avoided by Congress entrusting to an
administrative agency the functions of a jury. History Adrift 532-33 & 534 n. 154. This would be
accomplished pursuant to congressional power under Article III to ordain and establish inferior
courts, which includes the power to fix federal jurisdiction for new statutory rights. Id. at 531.
See generally L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 99 (1965); 83 Cong. Rec. 401
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on what the Court considered to be the exigencies of bankrupty ad-
ministration. 3 2
Analogous to the situation where a jury might hamper the efficiency of the
proceeding is the affirmation in recent decisions of Congress' power to avoid
a jury trial by entrusting the jury's functions to an administrative agency. In
Curtis v. Loether3 3 an action for damages was brought for violations of the
Fair Housing Provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.31
Although a jury trial is not required in an action for back pay under the Fair
Employment Provisions of Title VII of the Act,35 the Court found that the
language of Title VII contrasted sharply with the language of Title VII. Title
VIII's "simple authorization of an action for actual and punitive damages, '36
necessitated a jury trial. The Court took note of the "congressional power to
entrust enforcement of statutory rights to an administrative process or
specialized court of equity free from the strictures of the Seventh Amend-
ment," but distinguished its case:
[W]hen Congress provides for enforcement of statutory rights in an ordinary civil
action in the district courts where there is obviously no functional justification for
denying the jury trial right, a jury trial must be available if the action involves rights
and remedies of the sort typically enforced in an action at law.17
The jury trial guarantee was examined along similar lines in Pernell v.
Southall Realty. 38 There an action was brought to recover possession of real
property under a District of Columbia statute. Although the statutory pro-
ceeding was "a far cry in detail from the common-law action of ejectment,"
(1938) (remarks of Rep. Halleck) (Federal Trade Commission referred to as a quasi-judicial
body).
32. The concept of "strangeness to the common law" may be another basis for the decision,
History Adrift 528-30 & nn.133-35.
33. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
34. Title VIII provides in part: "The court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any
permanent or temporary injunction ... and may award to the plaintiff actual damages and...
punitive damages .... " 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970); see Kelly v. Armbrust. 351 F. Supp. 869,
871 (D.N.D. 1972).
35. The Curtis decision did not reach this issue, but noted that the circuit courts have so held.
415 U.S. at 197. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th
Cir. 1969). Title VII provides in part: "[T]he court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.
which may include... reinstatement... with or without back pay ... or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(g) (Supp. 11, 1972); see Ochoa v.
American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914, 919 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
36. 415 U.S. at 197. The Court also considered other bases for the jury trial award and found
that the damage action sounded basically in tort whether viewed as an extension of the common
law duty of an innkeeper not to refuse temporary lodging to travelers without justification, or as
defamation, or as the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 195-96 & n. 10. The Court
recognized that a jury might cause delay, and that in some instances the racial prejudice of the
jurors might prevent a fair trial. The Court felt that in those circumstances the judge could
protect the plaintiff by directing the verdict. Id. at 198.
37. Id. at 195 (footnote omitted).
38. 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
1975]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the Supreme Court found that it served "the same essential function."'39 The
Court awarded a jury trial quoting language from Whitehead v. Shattuck:40
" '[W]here an action is simply for the recovery and possession of specific real
or personal property, or for the recovery of a money judgment, the action is
one at law.' ",41 In both Curtis and Pernell, the Court's decision was based to
some extent on the simplicity of the damages involved. 42  Of greater
significance in Pernell, however, was the Court's reference to the absence of
an administrative background. The Court observed that under the particular
statutory proceeding no agency was present either as an adjudicator or
investigator, 43 but assumed that the "Seventh Amendment would not be a bar
to a congressional effort to entrust landlord-tenant disputes . . . to an
administrative agency." 4 4 Although this language is only dictum, it does
suggest that the Court's decision might have been otherwise had such an
agency been present. More importantly, it indicates that the Court considers
an evaluation of the administrative backdrop to be an integral part of seventh
amendment inquiry.
No similar evaluation was evident in the decision in United States v. J.B.
Williams Co. 45 The court, perhaps wary of the caveat in Ross regarding
procedural obstacles, mechanically applied the Ross criteria, and awarded a
jury trial in a penalty action based upon alleged violations of an FTC cease
and desist order. The Commisssion's findings with respect to the violation
were largely disregarded and the expertise of the agency ignored. Since recent
decisions involving administrative agencies seem to indicate that a fourth
consideration is to be added to the Ross formulation, namely, evaluation of
the agency function and administrative proceedings, the analysis in Williams
may be a step backward in jury trial inquiry.
In Williams, a penalty action4 6 was brought by the government based upon
alleged violations of an FTC cease and desist order. In awarding the
39. Id. at 375.
40. 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891).
41. Id., quoted in 416 U.S. at 370.
42. The Court also found that a jury would not hamper the efficiency of the proceeding. 416
U.S. at 384-85.
43. Id.; see United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 451 (2d Cir. 1974) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting).
44. 416 U.S. at 383. The Court distinguished its situation from that presented In Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921) (statute made right of tenant to occupy rental property subject to
control by a commission, including price regulation). The Court stated that Block stood for the
principle that the seventh amendment is "inapplicable in administrative proceedings, where jury
trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication." 416 U.S. at
383.
45. 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
46. Id. at 420. Section 5(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides: "Any person,
partnership, or corporation who violates an order of the Commission after it has become final,
and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay to the United States a civil penalty of not
more than $10,000 for each violation, which shall accrue to the United States and may be
recovered in a civil action brought by the Attorney General of the United States." 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(1) (Supp. IH, 1973).
[Vol. 43
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defendants a jury trial on the issue of whether certain commercials were
violative of the order, the Second Circuit ignored both the administrative and
judicial proceedings which culminated in the penalty action. The process in
Williams was typical, involving three steps: first, the issuance and enforce-
ment of the cease and desist order; second, the compliance procedures
conducted by the FTC; third, the penalty action which may be instituted
when the Commission finds that an advertiser has aired commercials in
violation of the cease and desist order and usually in derogation of the
Commission's advice during the compliance proceedings.
The cease and desist order in Williams was issued by the FTC in 1965.1 7 In
a review proceeding in the Sixth Circuit in 1967, the order was granted
enforcement; 48 the issue before the court was. whether the Commission's
findings-that the advertisements were misleading-were supported by sub-
stantial evidence. 49 The cease and desist order prohibited the defendants from
representing "directly or by implication"50 that Geritol, an effective remedy
for those suffering from iron deficiency anemia, was also a general remedy for
tiredness, that "run-down feeling." After the cease and desist order became
final, the compliance procedures went into effect. During compliance proce-
dures the advertiser is required to submit reports detailing the manner of his
compliance with the order. Although the Commission need not respond to the
reports in order to initiate an action to enforce compliance,'" the Commission
47. 498 F.2d at 418.
48. J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967). After the FTC issues a cease
and desist order, review of the order may be obtained within sixty days in the court of appeals. 15
U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970). An order of the FTC will also become final after the time for the filing of a
petition has elapsed. Id. § 45(g)(1).
49. 381 F.2d at 887.
50. The 1965 cease and desist order prohibited advertisements which represented "directly or
by implication that the use of such preparation [would) be beneficial in the treatment or relief of
tiredness . . .unless such advertisement expressly limits the claim of effectiveness of the
preparation to those persons whose symptoms are due to an existing deficiency of one or more of
the vitamins contained in the preparation, or to an existing deficiency of iron or to iron deficiency
anemia, and, further, unless the advertisement also discloses clearly and conspicuously that: (1) in
the great majority of persons who experience such symptoms, these symptoms are not caused by a
deficiency of one or more of the vitamins contained in the preparation or by iron deficiency or
iron deficiency anemia; and (2) for such persons the preparation will be of no benefit ... Id. at
892.
51. Compliance procedures are conducted pursuant to 16 C.F.R. § 3.61 (1974). "(a) In every
proceeding in which the Commission has issued an order ...each respondent named in such
order shall file with the Commission, within sixty (60) days ... a report . . setting forth in detail
the manner and form of his compliance .... The Commission may... institute proceedings...
to enforce compliance with an order, without advising a respondent whether the actions set forth
in a report of compliance evidence compliance with the Commission's order ...." After the first
compliance report was submitted in 1968, and rejected, a public hearing was held where the
Commission heard argument and viewed representative commercials. The commercials set forth
in the second compliance report also were rejected and eventually constituted counts 1-4. The
commercials in counts 5-9 were aired before the third compliance report was even filed. The
Commission was not aware of the FemIron commercials, counts 10-11. until they were seen on
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in Williams did respond, allowing the defendants to submit three compliance
reports52 and giving them ample opportunity to amend their advertisements.
The commercials set forth in the second compliance report submitted in
January, 1968, formed the basis of the later penalty action. These commer-
cials warned viewers that they might be suffering from "iron-poor blood" and
recommended Geritol's ability to "build iron power in your blood fast."'Sa
Despite the Commission's objections to the use of the word "power" as
conveying a false impression, these commercials were aired by the defendants
for three weeks after agreement to cease using the commercials. At this point
the Commission made a certification of facts to the Attorney General,
empowering the government to bring a penalty action. 54 In the penalty action
in the district court the government was awarded summary judgment. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that a factual dispute existed as to whether
the commercials5 5 were violative of the order, a dispute which necessitated a
trial by jury.56
Although the issue presented in the penalty proceeding-is the advertise-
ment violative of the cease and desist order-is analytically different from the
issue presented in the earlier enforcement proceeding-is the advertisement
misleading-it is submitted that, as a practical matter, both issues present
similar problems involving the meaning of language and demand the same
expertise on what is deceptive. Since review in the enforcement proceeding is
confined to a substantial evidence standard, a standard involving consider-
able deference to the FTC's findings, it would seem that a determination of the
issues in the penalty action should also involve some deference, at least, to the
FTC's findings. Such deference, if properly exercised, would militate against
the use of a jury as fact finder.
television. At this point the Commission rejected the third compliance report and instituted
penalty proceedings. 498 F.2d at 419-20, 442-43.
52. 498 F.2d at 442.
53. Id. at 419.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 56(a) (Supp. III, 1973) provides: "Whenever the Federal Trade Commission
has reason to believe that any person, partnership, or corporation is liable to a penalty ... under
subsection (1) of section 45 of this title, it shall certify the facts to the Attorney General, whose
duty it shall be to cause appropriate proceedings to be brought for the enforcement of the
provisions ...." The 1975 amendments to the statute authorize the Commission to represent
itself in some instances. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 204 (Jan. 4, 1975); see note 106 infra.
55. Counts 1-4 involved commercials stating that "Geritol-iron enters your blood stream fast
carrying its blood-building power to every part of your body." 498 F.2d at 432. Counts 5-9 the
"sad-glad" series portrayed a mother saddened by the knowledge that she has iron-poor blood.
Later on in the sequence she is depicted as glad, "Thanks to Geritol." Id. at 433. Counts 10-l1
concerned the FemIron commercials. FemIron, a product of substantially the same properties as
Geritol, was advertised as a remedy for tiredness by juxtaposing a "tired mother" against the
"vital look" of the FemIron consumer, with the comment, "You see, some women even risk
becoming anemic and tired." Id. at 460.
56. Id. at 434.
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Decisions make it clear that the superiority of the FTC to the public in
deciding what is deceptive is basic to the function of that agency.5 7 In holding
that a jury comprised of that same public should determine in a narrower
context the issue decided by a court reviewing the FTC's determination in
the enforcement proceeding, the court in Wiliams arguably disregarded the
principal function of the FTC: "to determine '[t]he meaning of advertisements
or other representations to the public, and their tendency or capacity to
mislead or deceive.' "-58 The theory of an equitable public right was not even
considered by the court, despite the FTC's aim of protecting the ignorant
public:
The law is not made for experts but to protect the public,-that vast multitude which
includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making purchases,
do not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general
impressions. 59
As part of its regulatory and protective powers, the Commission has great
discretion in framing remedial relief. 60 Cease and desist orders form no
exception. The Commission is not restricted to prohibiting the "illegal practice
in the precise form" in which it existed in the past, but is "allowed effectively
to close all roads to the prohibited goal." 6 1 In reviewing these orders, the
57. See FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937) (rule of caveat emptor should
not reward deception); FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308,
1313-14 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (corporation sought injunctive relief against issuance of press release by
Commission alerting public to suspected violations); 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
58. Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1968),
quoting Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1963); see Holloway v.
Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 994 & n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
59. Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942), citing Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C.
Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910).
60. See FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428-29 (1957). See also FTC v. Morton
Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 54 (1948).
61. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952). If a commercial is ambiguous and
capable of producing the forbidden inference it is violative. See Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 322
F.2d 977, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1963), petition for cert. dismissed, 376 U.S. 967 (1964). This deception
was delineated in FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 675 (2d Cir. 1963): "There are two
obvious methods of employing a true statement so as to convey a false impression: one is the half
truth, where the statement is removed from its context and the non-disclosure of its context
renders the statement misleading [and] a second is the ambiguity, where the statement in context
has two or more commonly understood meanings, one of which is deceptive." (citation omitted);
see United States v. Ninety Five Barrels, More or Less, Alleged Apple Cider Vinegar, Douglas
Packing Co., 265 U.S. 438, 443 (1924) (purpose of Food and Drug Act in prohibiting misbranding
is to prevent use of misleading statements). In reviewing possible violations, courts are to
recognize that if the advertisers in "their subsequent commercials attempt to come as close to the
line of misrepresentation as the Commission's order permits, they may without specifically
intending to do so cross into the area proscribed by this order." FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
380 U.S. 374, 393 (1965). See also In re Whitney & Co., 273 F.2d 211, 214 (9tif Cir. 1959)
(criminal contempt proceedings for violation of cease and desist order).
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courts thus afford special deference to the Commission's judgment. 62 The
Supreme Court in FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. referred to this:
[A]s an administrative agency which deals continually with cases in the area, the
Commission is often in a better position than are courts to determine when a
practice is "deceptive" within the meaning of the Act. This Court has frequently stated
that the Commission's judgment is to be given great weight by reviewing courts. This
admonition is especially true with respect to allegedly deceptive advertising since the
finding of a § 5 violation in this field rests so heavily on inference and pragmatic
judgment.63
There is some indication that such deference should also be afforded to the
determinations of the FTC compliance proceedings, although this was not the
result in Williams. In Floersheim v. Weinburger,64 a declaratory judgment
action brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia, the
petitioner challenged the rejection by the FTC of a compliance report. The
district court's review was confined to whether substantial evidence supported
the Commission's findings; the Commission's response would be accepted
unless it was "arbitrary or clearly wrong." 65 In his dissent in Williams, Judge
Oakes aptly questioned, "[i]n a penalty action based on the Floersheim
violations, would not that action be res judicata?" 66 In other words, would
not the substantial evidence standard of review be appropriate in Williams?67
62. The same deference applies to the Commission's review of the findings of the Hearing
Examiner. The Commission may not reverse the Examiner without considering the evidence
adduced in the hearing, since this would not comport with the standards of due process.
Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also
Chieppo Bus Co. v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 1192, 1197 (D. Conn. 1974) (ICC given "wide
latitude" in fact finding and application of law to facts).
63. 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (footnote omitted). Under the substantial evidence standard the
"findings of the Commission as to th2 facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive." 15
U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970). In Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 477, 499 (1971) it was observed that "[tihe possibility of two inconsistent
inferences does not prevent a determination from being supported by substantial evidence; and
the inference chosen by the Commission will not be set aside merely because the court would
draw a different one. Such judicial deference is not based on some abstract distinction between
'law' and 'fact'; rather, it follows from recognition that the task of drawing conclusions from
established facts is one peculiarly appropriate for a body of experts in the field." (footnotes
omitted). See FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52, 63 (1927); Doherty, Clifford,
Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1968); Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d
654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1957). See also FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417
U.S. 380, 389 (1974); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968); ICC v. Union
Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 547 (1912); Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and
Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 81-82 (1944).
64. 346 F. Supp. 950 (D.D.C. 1972) (under Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704
(1970)).
65. 346 F. Supp. at 957.
66. 498 F.2d at 455 n.33.
67. Congress has provided for the imposition of penalties by agencies subject to judicial
review on the substantial evidence standard. See 8 U.S.C. § 1321 (1970) (penalty imposed by
Attorney General for prevention of unauthorized landing of aliens); 12 U.S.C. § 1425a(d) (1970)
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The court's evaluation of the compliance procedures in Williams was
ambiguous. The FTC's objections to the phrase "iron-power" in Geritol
commercials were dismissed as "baseless. ' 68 Yet, the court's appraisal of the
Femiron commercials, which represented that FemIron, a product of sub-
stantially the same properties as Geritol, could remedy tiredness, was entirely
opposite. As to the FemIron commercials the court upheld the district court's
award of summary judgment,69 since those commercials contained "a vice
similar to the one the Commission had properly found with respect to the
commercials submitted in the first compliance report."'70
The purpose of the administrative compliance reports is to protect the due
process rights of those subject to ongoing cease and desist orders. 7' By
construing the FemIron commercials as "similar" to those properly rejected in
one compliance report, while holding that a jury must determine whether
"iron-power" in Geritol commercials was properly rejected in another, the
court opened itself to the charge of ignoring the procedural significance of the
reports unless it happens to agree with FTC findings."-
In a somewhat different context, the Second Circuit, in United States v. St.
Regis Paper Co., has ruled that the "duty and responsibility for determining
. . . whether cease and desist orders ... have been complied with or violated
was delegated solely to the FTC. '73 The Williams court commented: "The
court [in St. Regis] was not saying that the FTC['s]. . .ex parte determina-
(penalty provisions enforced by Federal Home Loan Bank); 16 U.S.C. § 1375(a) tSupp. II, 1974)
(district court has jurisdiction to hear and decide action provided person is given notice and an
opportunity for a hearing with respect to violation of Marine Mammal Protection Act); 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(a) (Supp. I1, 1973) (court shall hear such action based on the record, provided person is
given notice and an opportunity for a hearing with respect to violation of Endangered Species Act
of 1973); 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1970) (Commission authorized to assess penalties for violation of
Occupational Health & Safety Act) (upheld in Irey v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, No. 73-1765 (3d Cir., Nov. 4, 1974) but court stated that "ltlhe necessity for an
administrative agency on occasion to submit its determination to the scrutiny of a jury of citizens
would be a healthful and disciplining experience." Id. at 9 n.h1); 39 U.S.C. §§ 5206, 5403, 5604
(1970) (U.S. Postal Service may impose fines on private carriers); 49 U.S.C. §§ 1678(a), (b) (1970)
(penalty for violations of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act may be deducted from sums owing
by the United States or recovered in a civil action). Compare 16 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1974) (FTC
"[a]djudicative proceedings are those formal proceedings ... which are required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.").
68. 498 F.2d at 432.
69. Assuming that a jury should decide the issue of violation, it would seem that the proper
question to be answered is whether a forbidden inference exists, not whether it is "most likely "
The court, however, did not adapt summary judgment procedure to the type of issue presented
and applied the "most likely" rule. Thus, when it categorized some of the inferences in counts 1-9
as "conceivable" or "possible," an argument can be made that it has already determined the
question it would place before the jury. See id. at 458 n.44 (Oakes, J., dissentingl.
70. Id. at 434.
71. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 394 & n.22 (1965). See also P. Woll,
Administrative Law: The Informal Process, 22 (1963).
72. Of course, if the court decided only that the obviousness of the Femlron violation made it
a "matter of law," then the court simply exercised a traditional judicial prerogative.
73. 355 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1966).
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tion of violation was entitled to weight in an adjudication proceeding before
a court."'7 4 The court's characterization of compliance procedures as ex parte
determinations appears inaccurate and such an estimate might easily under-
mine the efficacy of those proceedings. The findings of the Commission in
Williams were based on compliance procedures which included a public
hearing, oral argument, the viewing of representative commercials and re-
peated consultations with the defendants who agreed not to air the "iron-
power" commercials. If these findings are to carry no weight whatsoever in
the determination of a violation, what is their significance? Is the Commission
a school to learn how to circumvent cease and desist orders successfully? The
Second Circuit appeared to forget that the purpose of the compliance proce-
dures is to protect the due process rights of those subject to cease and desist
orders. As Judge Oakes stated in his dissent, "once an order of the FTC is
final, one subject to such an order has already had his 'day in court.' ,,75 He
further commented:
If a modified commercial is within the order, the issue of its "deceptiveness" or
"meaning" has already been litigated before the FTC even though that precise
commercial was never actually before the FTC prior to the compliance phase of the
proceedings. Whether it is within the order is a question in the first instance for the
exercise of agency discretion, subject only to review for abuse or if exercised arbitrar-
ily, capriciously or contrary to law. 76
The only prior decision to face the precise issue in Williams was United
States v. Hindman.77 There a district court reached a similar conclusion, but
based its decision on a faulty analysis which was subsequently criticized by its
own court of appeals, the Third Circuit. In Hindman, the defendant was
subject to a cease and desist order prohibiting him from representing that his
military uniforms were "custom-made." The government brought a penalty
action after representations by the defendant that his uniforms were "custom-
tailored." The district court's analysis of the issue was as follows:
[W]e must bear in mind the principle that the meaning to be given such representa-
tions as these is not the meaning which would be attached to them by experts, but by
the average man who would be likely to purchase the articles in question and to
whom those representations are thus made. 78
The court, noting that one definition of "custom-made" in the dictionary was
74. 498 F.2d at 429.
75. Id. at 449 (Oakes, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
76. Id. at 449 n.25 (Oakes, J., dissenting); cf. R. Lorch, Democratic Process and Administra-
tive Law 152 (1969).
77. 179 F. Supp. 926 (D.N.J. 1960). In United States v. Piuma, 40 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Cal.
1941), aff'd 126 F.2d 601 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 637 (1942), the jury trial question was
not raised although the situation was similar to that in Hindman. There the court granted
summary judgment holding that the substitution of "gland tonic" for "gland tablet" violated the
order.
78. 179 F. Supp. at 927-28. But see 498 F.2d at 450 (Oakes, J., dissenting) ("The statement
[in Hindman] is a non sequitur in the first place: while the question of deceptiveness relates to
laymen being deceived, expertise on what is deceptive is important.').
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"tailored, '79 nevertheless held that the defendant had the right to show that
to purchasers of military clothing a different meaning would attach. The
district court ruled that a jury must determine whether the label "custom-
tailored" means to purchasers that the clothing is "custom-made. "8
In United States v. Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co., 8 1 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected-in dictum--the district court's Hind-
man decision. In Vulcanized the cease and desist order prohibited the defen-
dant from representing that his combs were made of rubber. The defendant
informed the Commission in a compliance report that he would change the
labeling of his combs to "rubber-resin." This change was rejected by the
Commission, and after the defendant asserted his right to do so in a second
compliance report, the government brought a penalty action and was
awarded summary judgment in the district court. The Third Circuit agreed
that the representation "rubber-resin" was violative of the order and affirmed
the district court's award of summary judgment. The court criticized the
Hindman decision stating:
The holding was erroneous, since the sole issue before the court was whether or not
the labeling practice was within the proscription of the order and not whether the
labeling practice was deceptive. . .. [C]reating an issue of fact as the court did in
Hindman, would usurp the function exclusively vested by Congress in the Federal
Trade Commission to determine the issue of whether a labeling practice is misleading
or deceptive to the public.8 2
In Williams, further FTC procedures were considered only superficially;
this disregard was apparent in the court's routine application of the Ross
formula. The court approached the pre-merger custom and remedy by looking
at the requirement of a jury trial where the government sues to collect a
penalty based upon a statutory violation. There is little doubt that the seventh
amendment does apply to civil penalty and forfeiture actions,8 3 and that such
79. As precedent for its decision the Hindman court cited Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165
(7th Cir. 1942). Aronberg, however, was a cease and desist order enforcement proceeding, not a
penalty action; no question of jury trial was presented. The Seventh Circuit there granted
enforcement of a cease and desist order on a substantial evidence standard stating that it was for
the FTC, the "triers of fact," to pass on the credibility and weight of the evidence. Id. at 170.
The court observed that advertisements are not intended to be "carefully dissected with a
dictionary at hand," but rather to produce "an impression upon prospective purchasers." Id. at
167, quoting in part Newton Tea & Spice Co. v. United States, 288 F. 475, 479 (6th Cir. 1923).
Contrary to the Hindman court's analysis, this language was by no means an appeal to have
deceptiveness decided by the deceived. Instead, the court was emphasizing the special expertise
of the FTC in determining such matters-perhaps alluding to the situation where the language
properly understood would not be violative, but the overall impression would be.
80. 179 F. Supp. at 928.
81. 288 F.2d 257 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
82. Id. at 258-59 n.2.
83. See 443 Cans of Frozen Egg Prod. v. United States, 226 U.S. 172, 183 (1912) (seizure and
forfeiture); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 (1909) (penalty for inducing aliens to
immigrate); The Sarah, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 391, 392 (1823) (seizure on land under revenue
laws). The civil penalty action has been held to be an action of debt, debt being the classic
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right exists even where the statute is silent on the issue. 84 The court in
Williams found further support85 in the Curtis decision, pointing to the fact
that the money judgment there was held to be "legal." Yet, the statutory
authorization in Williams was not a "simple authoriiation" of damages as in
Curtis or Pernell; in Williams there were definite equitable overtones of the
type described in Jones & Laughlin. The Supreme Court, in FTC v. Ruberoid
Co., similarly stated that: "Orders of the Federal Trade Commission are not
intended to impose criminal punishment or exact compensatory damages for
past acts, but to prevent illegal practices in the future."' 86 Furthermore, as
Judge Oakes noted in his Williams dissent, in none of the cases involving civil
penalties or forfeitures "was there a prior administrative proceeding culminat-
ing in a judicially upheld administrative order, the violation of which was in
issue; in all of them the question of violation of a statute was being tried for
the first time ab initio."87 He further commented:
Consistent with oversimplification of the application of the [penalty and forfeiture]
cases to this issue . . . the majority ignores the fact that § 45(1) [the penalty statute] is
not an isolated "civil action" provision but rather is a provision conceived with and
embedded in a complex statutory scheme that is the very foundation of an administra-
tive agency's power. 88
The dissent's objections were not unfounded. The court's analysis of the
"complex statutory scheme" was confined to a review of the legislative history
of section 450).89 The absence in that history of any discussion of the jury
trial right did not prompt the court to examine the "purposes and objectives
of the [Federal Trade Commission Act] as a whole." 90 The only analysis was
a discussion of the debates over whether the penalties imposed, criminally
and civilly, should be for small fixed sums or set at a large maximum. The
court concluded that Congress gravitated between these penalty provisions
"apparently without any thought that the difference would have any effect on
the procedure to be followed in enforcement actions," 9 1 namely, a jury trial.
This analysis is quite remarkable since the amount of the penalty rests in the
trial judge's discretion. 92
example of an action triable to a jury. United States v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983, 984-85 (D.N.J.
1950).
84. See 5 J. Moore, Federal Practice 38.31, at 232-33 (2d ed. 1974).
85. 498 F.2d at 424.
86. 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952); see United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 355 F.2d 688,
696 (2d Cir. 1966).
87. 498 F.2d at 451 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
88. Id. See also Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protection for Defendants In Civil
Penalty Cases, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 478, 484 (1974).
89. In United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 355 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1966) the legislative
history of § 45(1), the penalty provision, was described as "sparse."
90. Id. at 693.
91. 498 F.2d at 426-27.
92. The judge is to consider the good or bad faith of the defendant in assessing the amount of
the penalty. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 354 F. Supp. 521, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd in
part, set aside in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
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The court also avoided the "practical necessity" rationale of Katchen in an
area where the history suggests it would be appropriate. The court in
Williams indicated that the reasons behind the 1938 amendments to the
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, one of which was the penalty
provision, were to make FTC orders more effective, and streamline the
enforcement procedure. 93 "The order of the Commissioner would definitely
become final as provided in Section 5 and become operative as to further
transgressions without the initiation of new proceedings as now required after
the violation occurs."'94 Apparently the court did not feel the delay a jury trial
would present to that enforcement procedure would be considerable.9" Again
the dissent's analysis of the penalty provisions was more penetrating. Judge
Oakes pointed to the incorporation of a similar penalty provision in the
Clayton Act.9 6 One of the objections to the earlier practice under that Act was
that enforcement of the order had to be secured in a subsequent contempt
proceeding, requiring proof of new violations; Judge Oakes reasoned that
Congress in patterning the Clayton Act penalty along the lines of section 45(1)
would not be authorizing a "system of new hearings and review, a procedure
that would require the agency . . . to try its whole case de novo.'9 7
In its consideration of the third factor listed in Ross, the limitations of
juries,98 the Williams court's disregard of the FTC's function of protecting
the "ignorant public" seemed the most unfounded. The court flatly stated that
no problems would arise when the jury would be asked "to determine only
whether a television commercial has made various forbidden representa-
tions," but then hesitated, stating that, "in any event," 99 the other two
factors-the pre-merger custom and remedy-clearly pointed to a jury trial.
The majority found further support'00 from Professor Jaffe's praise of the
Hindman decision where he stated: "The jury was to decide whether in
the opinion of purchasers the questioned phrase meant the same thing as
93. 498 F.2d at 425. See generally Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 992-94
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
94. H.R. Rep. No. 1613, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1937), quoted in 498 F.2d at 447 (Oakes, J.,
dissenting). The penalty clause was recently amended, Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153,
tit. IV, § 408(c), 87 Stat. 591, amending 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970) (codified at IS U.S.C. § 45()
(Supp. M, 1973)) in order "to insure prompt enforcement of the laws the Commission adminis-
ters." Id. § 408(b). The district court is now allowed to grant injunctive relief in the enforcement
of the Commission's orders. Judge Oakes's comments on this penalty provision were: "Mlit seems
highly doubtful that Congress would have incorporated what are clearly equitable remedies into a
§ 45(1) proceeding to increase the district courts power to deal with offenders if Congress had
realized that § 45(1) carried with it the right to a jury trial." 498 F.2d at 439.40 n.l (Oakes, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
95. 498 F.2d at 434.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 21(b (1970).
97. 498 F.2d at 449 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
98. See Hyde Properties v. McCoy, No. 73-2095 (6th Cir., Nov. 5, 1974) (jury would be
unable to cope with issue and would hamper efficiency of proceeding).
99. 498 F.2d at 429.
100. Id. at 422 n.8.
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the proscribed one. Who better than a lay customer to decide?" 10 1 Jaffe's
statement is subject to the same pitfalls as the Hindman decision itself-a
disregard for the necessity of expertise on what is deceptive.102 As discerned
by Judge Oakes:
One such "less appropriate" task for a jury [the lay customers] would be to decide a
question that has, for all practical purposes, taken 11 years of hearings, meetings,
litigation, a full-fledged judicial review, discussion and correspondence, and more
hearings, plus the unquestioned application of agency expertise, all at great expense to
the public treasury, to decide. 103
Perhaps it is only a naivet6 towards the advertising industry which has
surfaced in the court's underestimation of the FTC. Whatever the case may
be, that naivete and underestimation are fatal to its decision. Representative
Chapman's statement concerning the nature of the advertising "beast" is
significant in this respect:
Advertising copy is frequently changed as a matter of good advertising technique. By
the time the cease-and-desist order ... becomes effective the advertiser, as a matter of
course, will change his copy. He can continue this process indefinitely without running
any risk whatever of penalty, and when he has run the gamut of all the claims he can
plausibly make for his product, he can then change its composition, as patent-medicine
manufacturers have so frequently done, and repeat the process over and over again.10 4
Throughout the decade devoted by the FTC to the Geritol problem, its
good faith application of expertise was not questioned until this penalty
action. If the court in Williams now finds some defect or due process
deprivation in the record of these administrative and judicial proceedings, it
would be unreasonable and impractical not to send these problems back to
the agency' 0 5 which has dealt with them-for clarification, further investiga-
tion, or an administrative adversary hearing. In an era when the FTC, and
the Congress, are developing new methods to deal effectively with deceptive
advertising, 0 6 the majority's holding requiring a trial de novo on the issue of
101. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 319 n.237 (1965). But see Davis,
"Judicial Control of Administrative Action": A Review, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 635, 672 (1966).
102. See generally Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1176, 1189 (1961)
("There is, however, one major reason for nonjury trial which, if valid, survives merger and
therefore is perhaps the sole justification, if not explanation, for its retention-the alleged lack of
competence of the jury.").
103. 498 F.2d at 452 n.27; cf. Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46, 59 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
104. 83 Cong. Rec. 400 (1938) (remarks of Representative Chapman).
105. In a Third Circuit case, Judge Hastie dissented on the grounds that the defendant never
had an opportunity to contest the scope of the cease and desist order. Instead of arguing for a jury
trial on that issue, he suggested that "the Commission [should] challenge the defendant's use of
'rubber-resin' as deceptive in a new administrative proceeding, thus affording the defendant for
the first time an opportunity to contest that issue." United States v. Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics
Co., 288 F.2d 257, 262 (3d Cir.) (Hastie, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
106. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); Note, The FTC Ad Substantiation Program, 61 Geo. L.J. 1427
(1973). The Commission's powers have been broadened by enactment of the Magnuson-Moss
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violation can only prolong the cat-and-mouse tactics of the advertising game,
and signal a regression in flexible jury trial inquiry.
Christine C. Franklin
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637 (Jan. 4, 1975),
enacted, inter al, "to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act in order to improve its
consumer protection activities." Among the significant changes are: clarification of the
Commission's power to issue substantive rules specifically defining unfair or deceptive acts or
practices; implementation of procedural safeguards for the exercise of the rulemaking power, and
authorization to the Commission to commence actions for civil penalties in the case of knowing
violations and for redress of injuries to consumers resulting from any rule violation or unfair or
deceptive act or practice. See remarks of Representatives Moss, Broyhill and Eckhardt, 120
Cong. Rec. H.R. 12346-49 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1974).
